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Abstract 
Totalitarianism is perhaps unanimously regarded as one of  the greatest political evils of  the last 
century and has been the grounds for much of  Anglo-American political theory since. 
Confucianism, meanwhile, has been gaining credibility in the past decades among sympathizers 
of  democratic theory in spite of  criticisms of  it being anti-democratic or authoritarian. 
 I consider how certain key concepts in the classical Confucian texts of  the Mencius and the 
Xunzi might or might not be appropriated for ‘legitimising’ totalitarian regimes. Under an 
Arendtian approach to understanding totalitarianism, it is precisely an unproblematised relation 
to a normative History and Nature that underlies the potential compatibility or incompatibility. 
I argue against a longstanding prejudice that if  any form of  Confucianism would be totalitarian, 
it would have to be Xunzian. Against this, I hope to show that if  any form of  Confucianism 
would be totalitarian, it might well be a naturalistic Mencian Confucianism instead of  a 
constructivist Xunzian one. 
Totalitarianism is one of  the greatest political evils of  the last century and has been the chief  foil of  
Anglo-European political philosophy, motivating much of  it since World War II (e.g. Arendt 1968, 
Rawls 1996). Political philosophy in this vein has recently turned to reconstructing or drawing from 
Confucianism for contemporary political climates (especially with pro-democratic societies--e.g. Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Taiwan--that also have strong Confucian cultures; e.g. Tan 2004, Bai 2014, Chan 
2014, Bell 2015). However, there remains an important yet hitherto neglected concern about whether 
Confucianism, qua political philosophy, is compatible with--or even supportive of--totalitarianism. 
After all, scholars have suggested that “Chinese culture (or tradition) has long fostered totalitarian 
rules” (Chen and Deng 1995, 2), often claiming this to be because “Confucianism is culturally 
‘totalistic’ in nature” (Guo 2013, 50).  If  these claims were grounded in an actual theoretical 1
compatibility endemic to Confucian political systems, this should raise a red flag for reconstructive 
attempts. 
 I hope to begin addressing this worry with a close consideration here, by way of  Hannah 
Arendt, of  arguably totalitarian-appropriable, yet central, elements of  Confucianism--elements which 
have been conceptualised in different ways in the Mencius and the Xunzi.  This concerns 2
phenomenological aspects of  the social order Arendt distinguishes as ‘totalitarian,’ attending to how 
Mencius’ version of  the Confucian tradition is susceptible to alignment with them, whereas Xunzi’s 
version is not--or is at least less so. I focus here on how their different articulations of  the central 
 Arendt herself raises, but does not answer, the question of whether China under Mao is totalitarian (1976, xxviii; cf. 1
Baehr 2010).
 Accusers have understood the term ‘totalitarianism’ in various ways (e.g. Guo 2013), but I adopt here only Arendt’s 2
approach to the phenomenon, which has been the most influential (for alternatives, see, e.g., Sondrol 1991).
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Confucian concepts of  ren [仁, ‘benevolence’ or ‘humaneness’], rituals [li 禮], and the rectification of  names 
[zhengming 正名] might or might not be appropriated for ‘legitimising’ totalitarianism.  3
 By approaching totalitarianism with an Arendtian framework, I argue here against a 
longstanding prejudice that simply assumes that if  any form of  Confucianism would be appropriated 
by totalitarianism, it would likely be Xunzian (e.g. Huang 2001, Stalnaker 2015). This prejudice has been 
thought to arise from Xunzi’s heavier emphasis on rituals, embrace of  Legalist ideas, and his 
anticipation of  Han Feizi and the Qin Empire (e.g. Hansen 2000, Tao 2006). Yet against this, I hope to 
show that it is Mencian Confucianism that would be more susceptible to totalitarian appropriation than 
a Xunzian one. This would be due to the former’s characteristic commitment to a naturalistic conception 
of  political legitimacy--for it is this commitment that would make Confucianism more vulnerable to 
totalitarian appropriation. ‘Naturalism’ is meant here in the sense of  a “philosophical orientation that 
seeks the source of  normativity in the natural realm [emphasis added],” not a more general sense of  
explaining phenomena in terms of  natural elements or employing methods from the natural sciences 
(Lee 2005, 2). This may be characterised as ‘naturalism about normativity’, versus ‘metaphysical’ or 
‘methodological’ naturalisms. Xunzi may be ‘naturalistic’ in these latter senses but the concern here is 
only for naturalism about normativity.  4
 For this paper, I am interested in compatibility in the weaker sense of  the plausible appropriability 
of  Confucianism for grounding totalitarianism’s denial of  freedom and its ersatz legitimacy. That is, in 
order to provide maximal interpretive charity to those who would accuse Confucianism of  being 
totalitarian, I only attend to the weaker claim of  how Mencian and Xunzian versions of  Confucianism 
might be appropriated, rather than any stronger notion of  compatibility such as employability. Yet, 
though appropriated, the concepts would nevertheless be characteristically Confucian (here, Mencian). 
Analogously, just as Nazi Germany did not so much employ Nietzsche’s philosophy as appropriated it, 
contemporary reconstructions of  a Nietzschean political system must pay heed to what makes 
characteristically Nietzschean concepts susceptible to totalitarian appropriation (cf. Golomb and 
Wistrich 2002). 
 To be clear, whether Mencius is generally a better source for political philosophy or whether 
Xunzi is more prone to authoritarianism are not concerns here.  Further, the argument does not entail 5
that a Xunzian brand of  authoritarianism would be choice-worthy, only that there are two different 
ways in which Confucian (better: Confucianism-inspired) political systems may be illegitimate, with 
each requiring different sorts of  criticisms and strategies of  resistance. 
1. An Arendtian Framework 
A central puzzle for understanding totalitarianism is how, despite compromising freedom and 
normative legitimacy, it still possesses putative legitimacy for contributory participants. One way to 
characterise Arendt’s approach to this would be as a phenomenology of  human activity undermined by, 
and yet grounding, totalitarian elements of  terror and ideology. 
 For Arendt, human activity (vita activa) involves a phenomenological triad of  labour, work, and 
action (Arendt 1998). Labour, the dimension with the human being understood as animal laborans, 
 I leave ren [仁] untranslated to emphasise its association with ren [⼈] as ‘human’.3
 E.g. John Bethrong refers to Xunzi as propounding “non-reductive naturalism” in the metaphysical sense (Bethrong 4
2016, 348).
 For a discussion on Xunzi as appropriable for authoritative but non-authoritarian Confucian government, see Tan 2010.5
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corresponds to the necessary processes needed to sustain biological life as a species--the products of  
which are consumed as part of  the processes. Work, with the human being understood as homo faber, 
corresponds to our relation to the artificial world through our production of  interrelated artefacts and 
engagement with them--the products of  which have permanence outside of  the activity and give rise to 
a common world. Action, with the human being understood as a zōon logon ekhon, corresponds to our 
relations to other human beings, disclosing ourselves through speech and action, unmediated by things 
(as ‘whos’ and not ‘whats’, e.g. Duke Ling to Mi Zixia and not a ruler to a courtier)--the products of  
which are political communities. Because work and action are free from the bare necessities of  animal 
survival, these are considered dimensions of  freedom, inasmuch as an individual is free from biological 
demands. And as dimensions of  freedom, their stability is not passively guaranteed by nature even 
though they supervene on them. 
 Importantly, a political community consists in the interrelational network of  individuals as they 
manifest in speech and action. In this network, human beings act and understand themselves with 
reference to the demands governing the activity, that themselves issue from the founding event wherein 
the community is initially formed--by a plurality of  individuals relating to each other on the basis of  
self-presentations unencumbered by the demands of  work or labour (hence being obliged by freedom 
rather than power or persuasion). The internal stability of  this network of  individuals is a result of  the 
persistence of  the materiality and organisation of  speech and action in the narratives of  these 
presentations, which are maintained by feedback loops between the zōon logon ekhon and their narratives 
(Arendt 1998, cf. Thiele 2009). The standards and models that govern a world of  action, then, would 
have the relevant normativity (e.g. the laws governing a particular state) inasmuch as they induce the 
participation of  its individual actors sans coercion and persuasion within the community (Arendt calls 
this ‘authority’); relate a participant back to the community’s founding event (‘religion’); and are seen as 
the standards and models encoding the testimony of  those who witnessed and created the founding 
event, even if  later augmented by recognised representatives (‘tradition’). 
 For Arendt, this conceptual triad of  authority, religion, and tradition is not only compatible with, 
but constitutes, political legitimacy: it confers normative stability upon the free relations among a 
plurality of  individual human beings in a political community (Arendt 1968).  And while she is 6
concerned with the loss of  this triad in Anglo-European modernity, it is not difficult for us to see how 
a Confucian regime would prima facie possess normative legitimacy in this sense, since it would 
classically satisfy the triadic conditions. Such a regime would have authority inasmuch as the participation 
of  individual actors would be induced by virtue (neither coercion nor persuasion): the Analects 
characterises a ruler’s exemplary virtue as radiating to the people, conducing their obedience and 
sometimes their own virtue (Analects 2.3, 12.19). It would have religion inasmuch as a participant is 
related back by its standards and models to the community’s founding by the sage kings. And it would 
have tradition inasmuch as rituals and learning function as standards and models that encode the 
testimony of  those sage kings, as well as later, recognised augmenters of  those codes (e.g. Confucius). 
 Arendt understands a totalitarian regime to not only compromise freedom and normative 
legitimacy, but in doing so impute an ersatz legitimacy upon itself.  She characterises totalitarianism as 7
 ‘Normative’ here is meant in terms of the structure of authentic human activity versus substantive morality, which would 6
involve discussion of the content of those norms.
 An authoritarian regime uses laws that restrict freedom in restricting the scope of work and action, thus (ironically) 7
losing authority because participation in the regime is not secured by political obligation but the enforcement of such 
laws. But this does not by itself confer putative legitimacy on the state for complying participants and there still remain 
spaces of appearances, within which individuals could present themselves to others as distinct individuals.
 of 3 18
[PREPRINT]
[PREPRINT]
the “rise of  the social” or biological (Arendt 1998, 38), inasmuch as totalitarianism reduces all human 
activity to the sole dimension of  labour by foreclosing--versus merely restricting--the dimensions of  
work and action entirely. This reduction occurs due to the interrelated elements of  terror and ideology, 
which function to confer putative legitimacy by collapsing action and work into labour--and thus 
enclosing politics purely within the dimension of  the animal laborans. 
 Terror forecloses action by reducing the human plurality of  individuals into a singular 
conception of  ‘mankind’: as a literal body politic. Rather than a lawlessness such as in the case of  
tyranny, where ‘laws’ are subject to the arbitrary will of  a single individual, terror is precisely a 
lawfulness to the laws of  History and Nature which “eliminates individuals for the sake of  the 
species” (Arendt 1976, 465). This involves the state identifying its laws with the supposed laws of  an 
unfolding History or Nature, aimed at fabricating humanity as an objective singularity. And unlike 
authoritarian forms of  government, which attempt to stabilise the (quasi-)political community by 
curbing spontaneous action with positive laws (which, in a way, themselves set up “boundaries and 
channels of  communication between men”), totalitarian ‘stabilisation’ is carried out by means of  
eradicating such laws which individuate and connect human beings (Arendt 1976, 465). It functions to 
relate individuals by de-individuating them as mere specimen, merging human plurality into a single 
humanity and effacing the space of  distinction between human beings. 
 Ideology forecloses work by necessitating all activity according to a single idea. Where terror 
realises the state’s identification of  its laws with the laws of  History and Nature, ideology realises the 
state’s identification of  the development of  an idea with the movement of  History and Nature. This 
development is “the consequence of  the ‘idea’ itself  and needs no outside factor to set it into motion,” 
being able to explain every historical and natural event according as the unfolding of  its internal 
logicality (Arendt 1976, 469). This process, which is more primary a concern for a totalitarian state than 
the ‘idea’ itself  (e.g. Aryanism), is achieved by the application of  dialectical logic to every idea, such that 
each idea “is transformed into a premise” (Arendt 1976, 469). This overlay of  ideological framework 
upon reality results in all entities being understood and experienced as mere resources to be utilised for 
ends external to them whenever necessary. The connection that human beings might have had to the 
world, by relating to the world as a human artifice, is mediated (or, rather, interrupted) by the ‘reality’ 
of  ideology which insists on “a ‘truer’ reality concealed behind all perceptible things” (Arendt 1976, 
470–471). The animal laborans thus contributes to the fabrication process not even as a unique specimen 
but as a specimen that is dispensable and replaceable, against the background of  a normative History and 
Nature. 
 A totalitarian regime is thus stabilised by an ersatz legitimacy grounded in terror and ideology 
rather than freedom: authority does not rely on coercion or persuasion for inducing the participation 
of  its actors, but it instead relies on the natural necessity of  the animal laborans (e.g. survival of  the 
Aryan species); religion relates a participant back to a cosmic inauguration of  History and Nature by 
which the disindividuated participant is understood as an undifferentiated specimen of  a transhistorical 
species (e.g. Aryan racial genealogy and their divine lineage); and tradition involves standards and 
models that encode the ‘testimony’ of  History and Nature (e.g. Nazi racial policy). 
 The comparison set out here thus concerns whether the Mencian or Xunzian articulations of  
this triad of  authority, religion, and tradition lend themselves to such a totalitarian appropriation in the 
functioning of  terror and ideology. Accordingly, I compare Mencius and Xunzi with respect to their 
distinct understandings of  ren as the grounds of  virtue, the relating of  a participant of  the social order 
to the sage kings by means of  the rituals (leaving aside learning here), and how the standards and 
models encode the sage kings’ testimony and the principles of  their augmentation in the rectification of  
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names. I evaluate them on the basis of  whether their articulations are consistent with a singular 
understanding of  humanity as expressive of  a normative History and Nature or grounding motivation 
for participating in the regime in natural necessity. As such, how ren, rituals, and rectification relate to 
Mencius and Xunzi’s conceptions of  human activity par excellence is central to the comparison. 
2. Mencian Naturalism 
Ren, at the core of  the Confucian conception of  virtue, has two senses. In its first sense, it is an all-
encompassing normative ideal, which may be translated as ‘humanity’ (as in ‘humaneness’).  In its 8
second sense, it is a single desirable disposition among others constituting one’s humanity and located 
in the heartmind [xin ⼼], which may be translated as ‘compassion’. For Mencius, being human [ren ⼈] 
is connected in principle to humaneness in ren. He states that “[h]umaneness is to be human” (7B16) 
and goes as far as referring to anyone lacking the relevant proto-dispositions (e.g. ceyin 惻隱, which 
leads to ren) as not being human [feiren ⾮⼈], as lacking one’s Heaven [tian 天]-endowed humanity 
(2A6). 
 This natural-normative conception of  humanity is elaborated in Mencius’ twofold articulations 
of  it in terms of  agriculture metaphors (e.g. four proto-dispositions as the heartmind’s ‘four 
sprouts’ [siduan 四端]) and also in terms of  qi [氣], the ‘vital energy’ permeating all things, with this 
concept being resonant with the “‘material virtue’ traditions” of  the time like the medical text Huangdi 
Neijing (Raphals 2011, 147; cf. Csikszentmihayli 2004). An individual’s qi was understood to be in a 
feedback loop with the heartmind: the heartmind’s directedness [zhi 志] would determine the flow of  
qi, but were it not directed, it would be buffeted by qi (2A2). And it on the basis of  such a directed flow 
of  qi that normatively appropriate action, i.e. yi [義], may be flexibly achieved in any circumstance (Choi 
2019). 
 Notably, one’s qi and pure qi (including the cycles of  meteorological and seasonal qi) are not 
normatively discontinuous. As Mark Csikszentmihayli argues, Mencius’ description of  his own qi as 
“vast, flowing” [haoran 浩然] and “consummately great and consummately strong” in 2A2 is best read 
in line with early commentators, such as Dong Zhongshu, who understood it as Heavenly qi [tianqi 天氣] 
(Csikszentmihalyi 2004, 153).  ‘Vast, flowing qi’ is thus said to “[fill] the space between Heaven and 9
Earth” (2A2), suggesting a natural-normative continuity between the corresponding appropriate activity 
of  one’s heartmind and the organic processes of  Heaven. In this sense, nourishing and preserving the 
heartmind [cunxin 存⼼] to fully develop it may be said to “serve Heaven” (7A1). Human activity par 
excellence, therefore, aims at preserving the heartmind and nourishing qi because this would accord with 
one’s nature [xing 性]--and such nature is said to be common to the ordinary person and the sage kings 
who are same in kind [lei 類] (2A6, 6A6–7, 6B2). Mencius would even compare someone who can no 
longer preserve [cun 存] this to “be at scant remove from the [non-human] animals” (6A8). 
 Here, I follow Irene Bloom’s (2009) translation of the Mencius and Eric L. Hutton’s (2015) translation of the Xunzi, 8
departing only when appropriate. Citations from the Xunzi follow Hutton’s divisions by chapter and line.
 For alternate readings of ‘浩然之氣’, see, e.g., Chan 2002a. Most readings, however, nevertheless converge on there 9
being a normative continuity.
 of 5 18
[PREPRINT]
[PREPRINT]
 From this, we may see that the authority of  a Mencian regime is grounded in a natural-
normative notion of  ren characteristic of  human activity, according to which individual actors (ruler and 
ruled, though led by the former) participate in the regime without coercion or persuasion. These 
participants are also related back to the political community’s founding as they cultivate the same qi as 
the sage kings, since they share the same nature. And rituals encode the sage kings’ testimony inasmuch 
as they facilitate activity that preserves the heartmind and nourishes qi: Mencius observes that the 
rituals arise from the four sprouts expressing themselves (3A5). The principles of  augmenting these 
rituals are similarly rooted in realizing human potential: in 5A2, Mencius in fact interprets Emperor 
Shun’s violation of  ritual order in failing to inform his parents about his marriage by appealing to 
Shun’s violation as an expression of  humanity [ren ⼈] (specifically, the “greatest of  human 
relationships”) that trumps ritual demand.  We thus find that a natural-normative conception of  10
human activity plays an important role in legitimising a Mencian regime. 
 The above reading would not be uncontroversial, turning on how such claims in 2A6 and 7B16 
should be interpreted. Bryan Van Norden argues that they are best understood as “generic” rather than 
speciesist claims, since the latter excludes psychopaths by conceptual fiat (Van Norden 2007, 220–222). 
Reconceptualising the species to exclude individuals is consistent with totalitarianism, yet what is crucial 
here is whether the principle grounding these claims can be appropriated by such regimes for their own 
normative conception of  the human species. Speciesist claims, after all, are simply a subset of  
principled generics, whose subjects’ features are grounded in natural kinds (cf. Leslie et al. 2009). That 
there are bad specimen (e.g. Ox Mountain cases of  6A8 or the wild man of  4B28) otherwise 
indistinguishable from non-specimen would be irrelevant for a regime aimed at perfecting the species. 
 Another worry is that this is an ‘essentialist’ reading that smuggles in some notion of  an 
Aristotelian substance, whose essence allegedly provides a natural teleology independent of  cooperative 
action in a social environment (e.g. Ames 2002). Such a conception of  teleology, they argue, would be 
foreign to the “early Chinese thinkers” who did not “[draw] a distinction between essential and 
accidental properties” (Shun 1997, 7). However, despite these philological concerns, it remains “the 
tacit assumption of  many scholars and translators that human nature in the Mencius denotes an essential 
property of  human beings” (Chan 2002b, 4; see Hansen 2000, Van Norden 2007). This is perhaps 
partly due to its significance for particular kinds of  reconstructive political projects: Roger Ames rightly 
observes that “the essentialist interpretation promises many of  the prerequisites for liberal democracy, 
certainly notions such as autonomy and equality, which provide a basis for individually conceived 
political rights” (Ames 2002, 86; cf. Angle 2002). So this reading would provide at least a warning for 
Confucian reconstructions of  liberal democracy intending to avoid totalitarian appropriation not to 
take Mencian naturalism for granted. 
 With this, I will now go on to consider how this naturalistic account of  Mencius may be 
appropriated in terror and ideology for a deindividuated conception of  humanity and natural political 
motivation, paying particular attention to the concepts of  ren, rituals, and the rectification of  names. 
 2.1. Terror and Nature 
Mencius’ notion of  ren may easily be appropriated for terror if  we consider the ways in which 
individuals relate to each other in ren and rituals take place against the background “organismic” 
 This also applies to concerns about learning: as Jane Geaney notes, “for the most part the interpretation of odes in the 10
Mencius also seems fitted to suit the occasion” (Geaney 2011, 138n27).
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processes of  Heaven--especially given the ‘continuity of  being’ which, undergirds ancient Chinese 
assumptions about reality, wherein “all modalities of  being are organically connected” (Tu 1989, 67). 
This continuity becomes salient when we consider the Mencius’ portrayal of  the ideal social order in 
terms of  a literal body politic and its dispensationalist theory of  sage kings. As D. C. Lau argues, 
Mencius seems to project the relation between the labour of  the heartmind and the labour of  strength 
onto the relations between ruler and ruled, providing a strict analogy between the person and the state 
(Lau 2004a, xviii).  Coupled with the influence on nourishing qi by one’s social position (7A36), it 11
would not be inconsistent to understand realising one’s humanity to be inextricably embedded in the 
realisation of  the humanity of  the body politic itself--if  not also extending to all-under-Heaven [tianxia 
天下]. 
 And when attending to his dispensationalist theory of  sage kings, however, the appropriability 
of  Mencian political philosophy for terror’s normative History or Nature becomes even more salient. 
In 2B13 and 7B38, Mencius sets out a theory charting the occurrence of  sage kings according to 
quincentennial cycles of  Heaven. But this is not merely a historical quirk of  some speculative 
philosophy of  history of  his time (Nivison 2002). It underscores the possible extent of  his naturalistic 
commitment: just as meteorological and seasonal phenomena are cyclical according to the 
determinations of  Heaven, so is the ren of  the body politic cyclical according to the same (specifically 
that of  all-under-Heaven) (cf. 1B14). 
 A totalitarian state may thus appropriate a discourse of  ridding itself  of  mutilators of  
humanity--seen as hindrances to the development of  the current dispensation of  the sage-cycle--to at 
least justify coercive and deadly force against ‘exceptions’ as necessary steps (i.e. weeding) towards the 
realisation of  ren. This might be one way to understand the exchange about the regicide of  King 
(Tyrant) Zhou, where Mencius justifies it on the basis that it was not ‘regicide’ but the “punishment” of  
a “mutilator” of  humanity [zeirenzhe 賊仁者] (Mencius 1B8, trans. Lau).  12
 Furthermore, since ritual originates in, and is subordinate to, ren as we saw in 5A2, ritual order 
may be seen as an instrument to facilitate the merger of  all speech and action in service of  the 
Heavenly narrative--rather than delineating boundaries between the zōon logon ekhon with their own 
narratives--and as such function to foreclose the phenomenological dimension of  action. 
 2.2. Ideology and Nature 
That human activity is normatively undergirded by an organic urge to manifest the same natural 
potential allows for motivating participation in a totalitarian regime on the basis of  the animal laborans’ 
activity. What is required is a kind of  hermeneutical overlay over (or, rather, undermining of) reality 
required for ideology. It is here that attending to the rectification of  names, alongside our considerations 
thus far, would be instructive in seeing how the natural-normativity in the Mencius can be appropriated 
to foreclose the phenomenological dimension of  work, since crucial to nourishing flood-like qi is 
“understand[ing] words” (2A2)--and, as Tan Sor-Hoon observes, “‘to name’ is closely associated with 
‘to command, to bring into existence’.” (Tan 2004, 179). 
 The Spring and Autumn Annals explicitly conceptualises communication between ruler and ruled in terms of body’s 11
flow of qi, which we have noted to be normatively continuous with the qi-at-large (Nylan 2008, 91).
 This totalitarian reading is contrary to how 1B8 is commonly interpreted, which takes Mencius’ justification to be based 12
on King Zhou having taken the non-ren course that leads to regicide because it incurred the people’s reprobation (4A2, 
cf. 5A5). E.g. Bloom translates ‘賊仁者’ as ‘brigand’.
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 The rectification of  names is crucial to the political project of  Confucianism more broadly, 
which may be seen as applying its conception of  government-as-rectification to the domain of  
language (Analects 12.17). Specifically, the rectification of  names involves the idea that “[a]n incorrect 
mode of  speaking and naming is a direct cause of  sociopolitical and ritual disorder” (Loy 2008, 235). 
And while there is no explicit reference to the rectification of  names in the Mencius (it is more often 
associated with the Analects 13.3 and the Xunzi), we nevertheless see Mencius expressing a similar 
concern for rectifying the heartminds of  people [zhengrenxin 正⼈⼼] by means of  disputation [bian 辯] 
(3B9). There are also arguably outright instances of  him rectifying names (Loy 2020): the discussion 
with Gaozi in 6A3–4 are resonant with the Neo-Mohist “dialectical chapters” (Van Norden 2007, 88; 
cf. Lau 2004b) and, as we saw earlier with 1B8, Mencius rectifies King Xuan’s use of  the term 
‘ruler’ [jun 君], when referring to the regicide of  the tyrant Zhou. Mencius also specifically distinguishes 
between “ritual” and “true ritual” according to whether a great person practises them (4B6, emphasis 
added), no doubt as part of  ensuring that words “correspond to reality” and, further, not “obscure the 
reputation of  a person of  ability” (4B17). Such rectifying disputation is rooted in an understanding of  
language as a natural tallying between names [ming 名] and objects in the world: a word designating a 
thing (‘horse’ for a horse) is a foundational semantic unit (cf. Fraser 2013).  
 But although such rectification does not on its own imply a “linguistic totalitarianism” in 
prescribing what one can say, it may nevertheless, coupled with natural-normative motivations, lend 
itself  to totalitarian appropriation for securing a ‘natural’ description of  the underlying reality of  things, 
since the rectification of  names is “a matter of  transforming a discourse or practice from within, by 
working on the connections between one’s words and actions and thereby influencing how others 
connect them” (Tan 2004, 179). In the rectification of  names, ways of  speaking and acting (of  being-
in-the-world) would be circumscribed by one’s natural-normative position within the social order. 
 Motivating the realisation of  the organismic process of  humanity would require mediating and 
severing human beings’ creative capacity and direct, unique relation to the world as homo faber: the 
rectification of  names would allow the totalitarian regime to do this by foreclosing deviant and 
destabilizing ways of  being-in-the-world. After all, nourishing qi requires weeding the heartmind’s 
seedlings, which is to rid one’s language of  “distorted,” “licentious,” “deviant,” and “evasive” words 
(2A2). As such, the rectification of  names would be able to provide “the most reliable of  all safeguards 
against the words and the presence of  others, and hence against reality as such” (Arendt 2006, 48–49), 
constituting the means whereby ideology might naturalise every experience within itself, with such 
naturalization leaving human beings unable to understand themselves apart from an animal laborans 
which has its “metabolism with nature” and thus precluded from cultivating the other dimensions of  
human activity (Arendt 1976, 475). 
 To sum, it is neither inconsistent nor difficult for a totalitarian regime to appropriate Mencian 
political philosophy insofar as it wants to stabilise itself  with an ersatz legitimacy facilitated by a 
naturalistic commitment to human activity: for, under a Mencian totalitarian regime, authority, religion, 
and tradition all normatively bottom out in the organismic processes of  Heaven. 
3. Xunzian Constructivism 
At the heart of  the Daoist critiques of  Confucianism (especially the Zhuangzi’s) are critiques of  a 
naturalistic enframing of  human activities as organic processes. So if  Confucianism is to avoid the 
above charge of  being susceptible to totalitarian appropriation, one option would be to turn to a 
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version of  it which takes into account these critiques and offers a way to reconceptualise political 
legitimacy non-naturalistically. One such version is the constructivist Confucianism of  the Xunzi 
(although I will also briefly gesture to a non-naturalistic Mencian reading later). 
 To clarify, the opposition between naturalism and constructivism set up here, pertaining to 
phenomenological concerns, is only tangentially related to an existing debate between ethical ‘constructivist’ 
and ‘realist’ readings of  the Xunzi (see Hagen 2007 and Hutton 2007).  These readings pertain largely 13
to the Dao’s metaethical status and its content, but that the Xunzi allows for the multiple realisability of  
social institutions is distinct from the question of  whether the text implies only one (Confucian) ideal 
way for them to be organised.  And even those in ‘realist’ camps are in agreement that human beings 14
participate in some ways to create multiply realisable institutions that can embody the Dao in a singular 
way (e.g. Ivanhoe 1999, Hutton 2007). 
 What is crucial here, rather, is that, while we saw Mencian Confucianism regarding Heaven to 
be normatively continuous with humanity, Xunzi makes a clear distinction between the natural realm 
and the human realm: the normativity of  human activity is not continuous (although nonetheless 
contiguous) with the operations of  natural processes. Left on their own, these operations do not 
conduce human activity above mere survival as animal laborans: this discontinuity is the reason for the 
flourishing of  human beings against the natural threat of  predatory non-human animals (Xunzi 9.329, cf. 
9.274). 
 The constancies of  Heaven are indifferent to human activities, and ethics and politics are 
fundamentally human affairs for which the facultative endowments of  Heaven are insufficient (Xunzi 
17.1–33; see Cheng 2014). Unlike Mencius, Xunzi does not identify being human with natural 
dispositions and qi no longer has normative significance.  The locus of  dispositions is not the 15
heartmind but the five facultative endowments [wuguan 五官]. Characteristic human activity is, rather, 
grounded in the heartmind’s making of  distinctions [bian 辨] in response to the provisions of  the 
faculties (Xunzi 5.104–115, reading 辨 as an activity). While non-human animals have distinctions (e.g. 
reproductive or sex-based), they do not make them.  16
 Notably, it is not mere possession of  the capacity of  distinction-making whereby we are 
considered human, because the heartmind itself  is a Heavenly endowment (Xunzi 17.57–58). 
Characteristic human activity emerges from the exercise of  our capacity for making distinctions. This is 
realised in deliberate effort [wei 偽], wherein “the [heartmind] reflects and one’s abilities act on” a certain 
disposition (Xunzi 22.16; cf. Lee 2005). That is, characteristically human activities involve the 
heartmind’s deliberation [lü 慮] which chooses on behalf  of  one of  the many dispositions of  the five 
faculties. Such a choice is based on how different forms, encountered by the five faculties, “are 
understood as different things” when they “make contact with the [heartmind],” which then makes shi/
fei [是/⾮] distinctions to mark differences between things perceived (Xunzi 22.59–60). That something 
is (shi) or is not (fei), is whether there is a said object--extending to designations of  whether something 
 ‘Constructivism’ here comes closer to social construction theories, broadly construed (e.g. Haslanger 2012).13
 For those favouring ethical constructivist interpretations, see, e.g., Hagen 2007 and Tan 2015. Conversely, see 14
Ivanhoe 1991 and Van Norden 2000.
 See Stalnaker 2006 for a discussion on Xunzi’s take on qi.15
 Non-human animals “have awareness [知]”, which even allows them to love their own kind [lei 類] (Xunzi 19.469), but 16
this is merely a matter of receiving phenomenal input from the faculties (Xunzi 22.93–94).
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is desirable or not (Xunzi 22.88–100). And this not unique to the virtuous: the vile person [jianren 姦⼈] 
is also said to deliberate (Xunzi 4.130–135). 
 According to Xunzi, the deliberations and distinctions that are made by human beings are 
intimately tied to, and created based on, a deep understanding of  the natural world. In “Discourse on 
Heaven,” he repeatedly emphasises the need to be sensitive to the triadic cosmological arrangement of  
Heaven, Earth [di 地], and humankind, and thus acting in a way that accords due diligence to each 
element--this being fundamental to how human activity should be carried out (Xunzi 17.1–39; cf. 
Bethrong 2016). Distinction-making should not involve deliberation on, but rather be appropriately 
responsive to, meteorological and terrestrial contingencies (their regularities and irregularities), since these 
are not affected by deliberate effort. Xunzi thus explicitly criticises Mencius as confusing what is 
“nature,” which “cannot be learned and cannot be worked at,” with what is “deliberate effort,” which 
can be learned and worked at (Xunzi 23.50–55). 
 Further, Xunzi distinguishes between two targets of  distinction-making: distinctions that 
pertain to non-human objects and distinctions that pertain to human beings, i.e. “social divisions” (or 
‘allotment’) [fen 分]. And these distinctions, in turn, are expressed in two different kinds of  activity [wei 
為]: work [shi 事] and practice [xing ⾏] (Xunzi 22.18–20). In work [shi 事], which distinguishes between 
non-human objects and animals, human beings act for the sake of  profit. And in practice, which 
distinguishes between the human activity of  work [shi 事], human beings form communities (Xunzi 
9.323–324). Without communities and their corollary social divisions, work that lacks communal 
organization would naturally result in chaos. 
 Again, the two targets of  distinction-making, along with their respective spheres of  activity, are 
not unique to the virtuous. As Eirik Harris astutely observes, for Xunzi, human beings “can self-
consciously form community based on [social] divisions” even before they “self-consciously form 
community that takes yi [義] as the basis for its [social] divisions” (Harris 2016, 103). The hegemon [ba 
霸] is already able to makes social divisions out of  “concern for the people [aimin 愛民],” expressed in 
“heavy laws [zhongfa 重法]” (Xunzi 17.200–201). But what distinguishes a community of  a hegemon 
and that of  a true king [wang 王] is that the former obtains participation by coercion and persuasion, 
while the latter enjoins participation by “virtuous reputation” (Xunzi 10.149; Harris 2016, 130). 
 As a Confucian, Xunzi’s political ideal is still a ruler who makes social divisions out of  ren [仁], 
expressed in ritual--where ‘ren’ means a “care [ai 愛] for others” corresponding to yi as appropriate 
channels of  care and ‘ritual’ means the appropriate models [fa 法] whereby yi is expressed and 
according to which people are socially divided (Xunzi 27.104–131). However, the key departure from 
Mencius is that, for Xunzi, the system of  rituals and yi were established by the sage kings, providing 
social divisions in response to the chaos of  unorganised work [shi 事] among the people, rather than 
arising continuously from any one’s own dispositions as we saw with Mencius (Xunzi 19.7–9). And it is 
this established system of  ritual and yi that has normative significance as the Dao.  17
 This is still compatible with either side of the ethical realist or constructivist debate: the Dao still may or may not be 17
multiply realisable. What matters for us here is only whether its normativity is secured by a continuity with the operations 
of natural processes--which it is not.
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 From this, we can see that the authority of  a Xunzian regime is grounded in a constructivist 
notion of  ren that is not characteristic of  human activity per se but instead minimally involves a care for 
others along the lines of  mutual profit, according to which individual actors are drawn participate in the 
regime without coercion or persuasion.  These participants are also related back to the political 18
community’s founding insofar as they act in accordance with the rituals and yi that were constructed by 
the sage kings--which thus also encodes their testimony. The principles of  augmenting (the content of) 
these rituals, which provide social divisions, would thus be rooted in appropriate responsiveness to the 
circumstances of  Heaven and Earth, since the ideal ruler fixates on neither “the ancient past” nor “the 
present” and his “policies adapt to changes endlessly” (Xunzi 9.219, 21.140–141; cf. Hagen 2003). We 
thus find that a constructivist conception of  human activity plays an important role in legitimising a 
Xunzian regime, for unlike a Mencian regime, there is a clear normative distinction between the human 
[ren ⼈] and humanity [ren 仁].  
 I will now go on to consider how this, unlike the Mencian conception of  humanity, would not 
be able to be similarly exploited for appropriation in terror and ideology, paying particular attention to 
how the concepts of  ren, rituals, and the rectification of  names would undermine a deindividuated 
conception of  humanity and natural political motivation. 
 3.1. Terror and Constructions 
What might seem worrying at first glance is that in the “Discourse on Heaven,” Xunzi describes the 
heartmind as one’s “Heavenly ruler” and the five faculties to be one’s “Heavenly offices” (Xunzi 17.50–
59), bringing to the fore an explicit image of  a body politic, similar to what we have seen with Mencius. 
Furthermore, the scope of  the true king’s ren is meant to encompass all people under Heaven (Xunzi 
9.202–205, 12.75–76). In this community, a combination of  work and practice would allow human 
beings to “overcome” non-human animals (Xunzi 5.113, 9.274–339). Yet, there are also numerous 
instances wherein Xunzi seems willing to compare deviant actors, those lacking ren, to non-human 
animals (e.g. Xunzi 1.135, 2.16–17, 13.189)--or seemingly going further in his dehumanization to regard 
those who disregard ritual as even less than that (Xunzi 19.481–2). It would therefore seem prima facie 
quite consistent for Xunzi’s promotion of  the proper order of  humankind, the third element of  the 
cosmological triad, to be appropriated in terror. 
 Yet, firstly, Xunzi’s analogy between the state and the body is not a return to a natural-
normative continuity. In fact, Xunzi’s aim in using them in this passage is precisely to use the discourse 
of  his interlocutors, who employed the discourse of  “[keeping] whole the accomplishment of  Heaven” 
to rely on natural processes, against themselves (Xunzi 17.69–70). If  keeping the accomplishment of  
Heaven matters to his interlocutors, they would do well to go beyond natural processes for guidance on 
how to do so. He explicitly notes that “[t]hat which is accomplished without anyone’s doing it and 
which is obtained without anyone’s seeking […] is called the work of  Heaven”: and one should not 
“[compete] with Heaven’s work” (Xunzi 17.27–34). Xunzi goes as far as to attribute the loss of  the 
accomplishments of  Heaven to a person not knowing the limits of  “what he is to do and he is not to 
do” (Xunzi 17.70–71). It is such ignorance that would result in socio-economic disorder, thus eventually 
affecting the person himself  too--which Xunzi emphasises as not being due to Heaven or Earth. 
Therefore, he is removing normativity from that which are to be naturally found in being human. 
 Many note that Xunzi’s concerns goes beyond just consequentialist ones, involving an irreducible aesthetic dimension 18
(e.g. Harris 2016, Loy 2016).
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 Secondly, in a more sober occasion, Xunzi laments that though he would “classify [brawlers] as 
birds, rodents, or beasts,” he cannot “because their form is nevertheless human, and their likes and 
dislikes are mostly the same as those of  humans” (4.57–59). Xunzi’s comparisons to non-human 
animals may thus be best understood hyperbolically, as part of  the “difficulties of  persuasion”: the 
need to “[shift] with the occasions and [bend] with the times,” to “raise remote parallels without being 
misunderstood, and cites closer events without being crude,” as the gentleman’s “method of  
inclusiveness” when dealing in others (Xunzi 5.193–213). Attending to his comparison of  someone as 
being less-than-animal, we find that this is because a hypothetical [ruo 若] person who acts in such a way 
would not demonstrate possession of  awareness, which even non-human animals have. 
 More importantly for us, this would also be inconsistent with the constructivist account laid out 
above: terror requires a singular conception of  mankind that deindividuates participants in a regime, 
but ren is precisely caring for others according to the social divisions of  yi which are multiply realisable, 
contingent on meteorological and terrestrial factors (which is not to say that rituals and yi are 
themselves multiply realisable; cf. Hagen 2003). The rituals set up social distinctions (including statuses, 
duties, and responsibilities) to prevent the world’s ‘bemuddlement’, which creates “great chaos,” by 
restricting the overstepping of  action and speech among people (17.242–243). Social divisions thus 
circumscribe space for speech and action, and such a space could be understood to allow actors to 
disclose themselves to others as a ‘who’ and not merely as part of  a body politic. 
 However, this would only prevent the foreclosure of  action and would not suffice for disclosing 
it. It is crucial to note here that Xunzi’s two spheres of  activities, of  work [shi 事] and practice, still only 
fall under the Arendtian notion of  work and not yet her notion of  action, since social divisions are 
made not on the basis of  harmonizing self-presentations but on the basis of  harmonizing desire. What 
is needed is an organisation of  social relations which supervenes on the shared, created world of  
named objects, yet not in such a way that determines the relations between human beings. Yet I think 
that we can take this constructivist position further for this in a way that was not possible with a 
naturalistic conception of  interrelationality. 
 One way to approach this would be to consider how there can be space for any disclosure of  
the individual in ritual practice if  rituals are the taking of  the actions of  sage-kings as models [fa 法]. As 
Antonio S. Cua suggests, it is not inconsistent to understand the term ‘sage-kings’ as titles retrospectively 
attributed to those who had established the rituals whereby social order is achieved--rather than the 
titles preceding the establishment of  the appropriate rituals (Cua 2000; cf. Lau 2000). This might be 
gleaned from Xunzi’s description of  the sage-kings as those who have crossed waters, “[marking] out 
the deep places” (Xunzi 17.238–240). Further, Xunzi emphatically does not take the rituals to fully 
encode the Dao and explicitly advocates the need to adapt rituals in response to changing material 
circumstances (Xunzi 9.219, 21.140–141; cf. Analects 9.3, Hagen 2003). Still, what is necessary for action 
is conceptual room for rituals to be adapted in response to changing social circumstances and not for 
the sake of  profit. 
 This can be drawn out of  the Xunzi. We can distinguish between two obvious ways of  ‘making 
distinctions’: the creation of  distinctions (as the sage kings did) and the use of  distinctions (as the 
common people do). But Xunzi also gestures towards a gradation of  use, between those who 
understand the rituals and those who simply carry them out “as set customs” (Xunzi 19.567–570). 
Moreover, as we saw earlier, Xunzi compares the conduct of  petty men to non-human animals, insofar 
as they act only according to natural dispositions and merely have distinctions (e.g. reproductive). Still, 
this does not mean an identification between the two, since non-human animals are not deliberative. 
 of 12 18
[PREPRINT]
[PREPRINT]
From these, it could be thus said that we use distinctions actively when we deliberatively agree upon 
them based on other distinctions, versus passively, when we simply take them as given. 
 What the active-passive distinction allows is the possibility of  a community of  distinction-
creators and active distinction-users (which need not be mutually exclusive in social practice), who are 
able to make themselves as measures in relating to each other (Xunzi 5.148) such that one’s creation of  
social divisions not only take into account the contingencies of  oneself  and others, but also the 
creation of  social divisions by others. The zōon logon ekhon may thus disclose themselves as a ‘who’ in 
the space of  this interplay between the creation and use of  social divisions. Moreover, what would be 
ultimately encoded by ritual can thus be understood as neither an irreducibly subjective action which 
excludes imitation, given its particularities, nor an objective fixation on a corner of  the Dao’s myriad 
dynamism. Rather, rituals would be understood as an intersubjective negotiation of  pragmatic 
considerations among distinction-creators-users, equilibrating over time to become stable and stabilising 
distinctions in specific, but an extensive number of, social contexts (cf. Wilson 2018). 
 3.2. Ideology and Constructions 
Similarly, a Xunzian rectification of  names both is resistant to totalitarian appropriation and harbours 
the possibility of  anti-totalitarian disclosure. 
 “On the Rectification of  Names” contains the most explicit exploration of  the titular notion in 
the classical Confucian canon, and one might expect this to better facilitate ideology’s hermeneutical 
overlay of  reality. And Xunzi seems to be just as hostile to those whose “arguments are niggling and 
without unifying order,” regarding them as “the vile person’s hero [jianrenzhixiong 姦⼈之雄]” who 
“cannot be changed” and would be the first to be executed under the regime of  a sage king (5.260–
270). 
 In sharp contrast to the naturalness of  names in a Mencian naturalism, Xunzi’s understanding 
of  the rectification of  names begins with the crucial premise that names “have no predetermined 
appropriateness” (Xunzi 22.123–124). Naming, importantly, neither precedes nor determines the 
distinctions differentiated by the heartmind among the forms which are encountered by the five 
faculties (Xunzi 22.58–87): names have no necessary, natural connection with the objects designated. 
Rather, naming forms is a post hoc exercise that isolates the particular forms encountered, making it 
possible for us to refer to them as things and compare their similarities with varying levels of  
specificities and generalities (Xunzi 22.88–139). Further, naming confers a ‘thingly’ permanence 
(though limited) upon otherwise impermanent forms. Only the distinct forms that have been named, 
agreed upon and “have become custom,” are ‘brought into existence’ as distinct objects in practice--
distinctions, as in differentiated objects, can thus be said to be created (Xunzi 22.125–126). 
 Yet Xunzi nevertheless regards some names to be bad and to bring about disorder, and 
advocates that one’s naming should follow the Dao as the “warp and pattern of  good order” (Xunzi 
22.189). But the reason for them being bad or bringing about disorder is not a matter of  natural 
necessity. The “predetermined goodness” of  names are purely a formal matter: “if  they are 
straightforward, simple, and do not conflict, then they are called good names” (Xunzi 22.126–127). So 
to rectify names would be to ensure that there is not a reckless creation of  names, such that there is not 
a “making up strange names so as to disorder the correct names” (Xunzi 22.37–38). Further, as the Dao 
was established by the sage kings, in aiming at mutual benefit, the creation and use of  names arise out 
of  pragmatic concerns: there is a need to “procure agreement” for names for successful communication, 
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intentions to be understood, and collective projects not to fail (Xunzi 22.192). This is how distinctions 
are social without yet being social divisions. And should the material conditions change such that our 
five faculties receive different forms, the capacity to create distinctions allows “a true king” to respond 
accordingly by bringing forward new names, and thus objects, where appropriate to replace old ones 
(Xunzi 22.53–55). The objects that we find constituting the world of  our activities do not thereby 
exhaust the possible objects that could exist, allowing for creative freedom in work. From this, we can 
see that the contingency acknowledged by such constructivism to underlie the rectification of  names--
located in both the forms encountered and the social creation of  the objects themselves--would be 
inconsistent with attempts by a totalitarian regime to appropriate the concept in ideology. 
 Moreover, creative freedom is not necessarily reserved for the true king. We can appeal to the 
same kind of  interplay in ritual, as involving the creation and active use of  social divisions in action, 
with the creation and active use of  names in work. And, more clearly than in action, it is possible for 
the Xunzian rectification of  names to have a participatory equilibrium in this interplay, wherein “the 
people and the government” are “coparticipants” (Tan 2004, 180–181; cf. Hagen 2002). Unlike a 
hegemonic state, such a Xunzian regime would not have names “imposed top-down unilaterally”: “the 
interactions that modify and are modified by those [names] in need of  adjustment” may be directed, 
but not determined, by the Xunzian state (Tan 2004, 181). As such, the division between the natural and 
the human world--the gap of  creative freedom foreclosed in ideology--would be itself  disclosed in the 
activity of  naming that Xunzi explicitly recognises everyone as capable of. 
 Correct names are those that secure the stability of  our activities in the shared world--and thus 
the stability of  the shared world as such. So the rectification of  names would thus be a constitutive 
activity of  the homo faber under a Xunzian regime, wherein distinctively human objects, having been 
mediated by the heartmind, are brought into a shared world of  permanence. This shared world then 
mediates and secures meaning for the activities of  human beings, who would otherwise be reduced to 
animal laborans alienated from each other, and a stable world outside of  Nature’s processes. 
 To sum, the twin elements of  terror and ideology of  the totalitarian state are less consistent 
with, and even meet resistance from, a constructivist version of  Confucianism. The concepts of  ren, 
rituals, and rectification contain within themselves inherent contingencies--which cannot be 
appropriable for the ‘natural’ and naturalizing necessity of  totalitarianism. We can also further see that 
the constitutive activities of  the vita activa may have the possibility of  disclosure where it would be 
foreclosed under a naturalistic version of  Confucianism. 
 As mentioned, there are non-naturalistic approaches to the Mencius, the most prominent being 
Ames’ process account. According to this, human activity par excellence would be a matter of  “social 
achievement”: ren would be fundamentally a social rather than biological capacity, with rituals and 
rectification as matters of  participatory construction (Ames 2002, 85). Others have attempted to 
maintain a biological base for a common humanity [ren ⼈] shared by human beings, while 
simultaneously resisting natural teleology (e.g. Bloom 2002, Perkins 2011). These accounts might be 
able to resist totalitarian appropriation in a similar way to the Xunzian account set out here, and their 
relation to totalitarianism warrant further attention. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that charges against Confucianism being appropriable for totalitarianism can be 
understood to be justifiably directed at a naturalistic, Mencian version versus a constructivist, Xunzian 
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version. I have also considered how the constructivist version might harbour the possibility of  
resistance against totalitarianism. 
 The problematic here is admittedly framed by a contemporary Anglo-European paradigm, but 
it is nevertheless crucial for its related schools theorising about politics to ask whether Confucianism 
(and its recent reconstructions) can at least assuage their originary worry. I submit that, against the 
relative decline in interest in totalitarianism within the current fields of  Anglo-European political 
philosophy (barring a few exceptions e.g. Caplan 2012), the possibility of  justifying such regimes is still 
a pertinent one today. This is so at least within the plethora of  ongoing discussions among political 
philosophers (in the anglophone and sinophone world) who are trying to assess the compatibility of  
Confucianism with democracy. Perhaps as a result of  recent Confucian reconstructions drawing more 
heavily from the Mencius than the Xunzi, we might see a number of  them open to the danger of  
totalitarian appropriation. At the very least, it is hoped that another approach has been offered here for 
assessing the relevance of  Confucianism to contemporary Anglo-European political philosophy: 
perhaps not in terms of  common goals, but at least common enemies. 
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